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Executive Summary
Over the last years sovereign investors have made a significant shift away from 
traditionally liquid asset allocations centered around fixed income and public 
equities, and towards more illiquid alternative investments (i.e. private equity, 
venture capital, RE and infrastructure) in search for higher returns. Since 2009, 
SWFs have invested $433bn in alternatives, with an average allocation as high as 
16% of total assets. This shift clearly plays to SWFs’ strengths, effectively leveraging 
their “patient capital” to generate illiquidity premia over the risk-adjusted returns 
achieved in public markets.
In this process, several SWFs have quickly realized how, developing successful 
alternative strategies can be a daunting challenge, with potentially disrupting 
implications on conventional business models, historically more geared towards 
investing through third parties. Having tipped their toes into alternatives mostly 
by committing capital to PE funds through a traditional LP model, SWFs have 
progressing moved towards a combination of the LP/GP model with new and more 
collaborative investing options. Furthermore, in an effort to mitigate the risks arising 
from too large exposure to direct investments and relatively limited capabilities in 
the asset class, in recent years SWFs have increasingly resorted to approaches that 
are more cooperative in nature.
In our analysis of SWFs approaches to 
investing in private markets, we have 
developed a taxonomy of four different 
models, along a spectrum of decreasing 
delegation levels: the LP model, the 
co-investment model, the investment 
platforms, and the direct investment 
model.
Co-investments, defined as deals where 
the LP invests alongside the GP in a 
target asset, have attracted SWFs’ 
attention as they reduce risk exposure 
while allowing for more flexibility in 
portfolio construction and exposure to 
risk factors. Furthermore, co-investment 
arrangements allow SWFs to expose 
their internal teams to new sectors 
and investment processes, working 
alongside experienced partners, and 
building capabilities to potentially step 
into full-fledged direct equity investment 
strategies. Investment platforms on the 
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other hand, are funds or joint ventures operating with a specific focus or mandate; 
they resemble LP arrangements in that they still involve a significant amount of 
delegation and intermediation by GPs, but SWFs have a more active role in platforms 
compared to the traditional LP model.
Three major trends stand out in our analysis of SWFs’ investments in private 
markets: 
1. The loss of importance of LP investments for SWFs in both absolute and relative 
terms, being replaced by co-investments, platforms and even direct investments 
sharing collaborative features.
2. The impressive “boom and bust” investment cycle in real estate surging until 
the record year 2015, when it reached about half of SWFs investments in private 
markets, and then sharply declining in the last three years.
3. The staggering growth of venture capital investments, with SWFs consistently 
increasing their allocation to tech companies and embracing innovation as an 
investment theme.
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Our main findings about SWF deal making in private markets can be summarized 
as follows:
• A major shift occurred in SWF approach to private markets over the last decade. 
Funds gradually but consistently replaced direct solo investments with direct equity 
partnerships. Between 2009 and 2018 direct equity partnerships increased from 19 
to 61 per cent of total deals, while solo collapsed from 69 to 21 per cent over the 
same period, revealing a complete change of strategy in the direct equity space
• SWFs limited, albeit slightly, their investments as LPs from 11 to 7 per cent of total 
deals, while increasing co-investments from virtually zero to 10 per cent between 
2009 and 2018. In 2018, co-investments deals were worth $7.9bn, accounting for 
22 per cent of total value
• With $12bn of total value since 2009, platforms represent an innovative investment 
model which gained ground especially in the 2012-2014, reaching a 3 per cent 
average share of deals in the last years
• The co-investment model represents a “soft landing” for SWFs into direct equity, 
and the numbers suggest that SWFs are testing with this model in earnest, in spite 
of inherent risks
• Real estate is the second largest asset class by SWF investment within the 
private markets bucket SWFs, with 342 deals worth in total $111bn. SWFs have 
turned away from investing in real estate funds and moved towards direct equity 
investments in this asset class, especially using the partnership model
• Technology has been the sector of choice for global SWFs in the second part of the 
last decade. SWFs flocked into this industry in earnest, executing 251 deals worth 
$37bn. SWFs’ entry into this space has not followed the conventional route of LP 
investments in VC funds, but rather new models of collaborative investments, 
namely direct equity partnerships and co-investments with the obvious exception 
of SoftBank’s Vision Fund, which needs a separate treatment.
• Investments in infrastructure have been quite limited, with a total of 75 deals in 
the 2009-2018 period, worth $27bn, of which almost 60 per cent executed in the 
last four years. The distribution of deal types in this asset class is completely 
skewed in favor of direct equity, with an equal split between solo and partnerships
• When investing directly abroad, SWFs tend to evenly split deals between solo 
investments and equity partnerships. At home, instead they have a much stronger 
preference for direct solo investments. This different behavior can be explained 
in terms of better access to information and investment opportunities in the 
local market
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• The majority of SWFs investments in private markets is concentrated in Europe, 
Asia Pacific, and North America, which together account for three quarters of total 
activity by deals and dollar value. Europe is particularly relevant in terms of value, 
reporting one third of the total, while Asia Pacific reports 31 per cent of deals, and 
North America about 18 per cent of both deals and value.
To conclude, SWFs’ journey in private markets is certainly not a linear process of 
disintermediation. Rather, it is a transition testing different models and adapting and 
optimizing investment strategies along the way. A visible trend is unfolding though, 
as the strategies adopted by SWFs are all consistent with getting a more direct 
exposure to private markets.
In the near term, we expect SWFs to take important decisions concerning their 
approach to direct private equity investments, and the multiple models identified in 
this report will still need a few years to prove their impact. This said we believe that, 
given SWFs significant and increasing value allocation to private markets in search of 
sustained returns, adopting a broad set of strategies, including the multiple models 
outlined in this paper, would allow them to diversify and reduce their risk exposure in 
such a relevant asset class.
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Introduction 
The step into alternative investment, that large pool of assets stretching 
from private equity and venture capital to real estate and infrastructure, 
has been one of the most discussed moves made by sovereign wealth 
funds (henceforth SWFs) in recent years. Lured by higher and – in 
some segments – safer yields, a wide range of SWFs tilted their asset 
allocation away from fixed income towards illiquid investments in private 
markets. The shift has been dramatic. SWFs have poured $168 billion 
into alternatives since 2009, reaching a high in 2015 when they allocated 
$27 billion. Today the average allocation to alternatives is 16% per cent, 
equivalent to US$1.17 trillion of assets under management (Lopez, 2019). 
If SWFs will maintain their current share of the overall industry (which is 
about 13% per cent), their exposure to that asset class will approach $1.8 
trillion in 2023, entailing more than $500 billion of additional investment 
value over the next five years (Preqin, 2019).
From a sovereign asset management perspective, allocating a sizable part of 
the risk budget to private markets makes sense. Their long investment horizons 
enable them to put patient capital into early-stage, high-growth companies and to 
generate illiquidity premia over the risk-adjusted returns achieved in public markets. 
Furthermore, SWFs can trigger catalytic investment in projects with strong socio-
economic impact crowding in private capital, and boosting economic and social 
development and revenue diversification.
Developing a successful alternatives strategy is, therefore, key for SWFs’ overall 
performance. However, in practice, the implementation of an ambitious alternatives 
investing programme is a daunting challenge, with potentially disrupting implications 
on conventional business models. Indeed, SWFs have been often characterized as 
large pools of assets managed by third parties or institutions with small staff making 
big-ticket investments in global public equity markets with a broad diversification 
mandate. Opportunities in private equity market arise instead by early entry in small 
firms or projects with high growth potential. Access, capabilities, and timing are 
fundamental drivers of success in this space. 
Traditionally, SWFs, like most institutional 
investors, started to build an alternative 
investment portfolio by committing capital to 
private-equity-style funds managed externally 
by general partners (GPs). However, SWFs 
have recently started questioning high 
management fees and the heterogeneity of 
fund performance and thus the validity of 
this conventional model of investment. As a 
result, SWFs have developed new ways to tap 
alternative assets through a combination of 
direct equity and collaborative investing.
Developing a successful alternatives 
strategy is a daunting challenge, with 
potentially disrupting implications on 
conventional business models.
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Aim of this report is to provide a comprehensive review of most recent trends in 
SWF investment in private markets. Based on new, transaction-specific information 
made available through an ad hoc data collection effort, the report first provides 
a rigorous classification of the main investment models and deal types observed 
in this market, and then tracks their evolution in the course of the last decade, 
from the great financial crisis to the end of 2018. The research identifies relevant 
regional and sector characteristics of SWF operations in alternatives, complementing 
the analysis with selective case studies of SWFs particularly exposed to these 
asset classes. The main finding of our research is the recent, momentous rise of 
collaborative investment, hence the title of this publication. All major, global SWFs 
have progressively increased the resort to cooperative investment models and 
partnerships, following strategies broadly consistent with the recently observed trend 
of disintermediation of financial markets and surge in direct equity investment. We 
claim that the shift to a more cooperative approach observed in recent times is a 
functional response to mitigate the increased risk stemming from significant direct 
equity investment in unlisted, illiquid targets. 
While we are observing a general trend across the SWF industry, initial conditions of 
individual funds obviously matter in the subsequent path towards disintermediation 
and direct equity investing. Some funds (e.g. Temasek, Mubadala) started with a 
local company portfolio which made it easier to leverage skills and invest directly. 
Smaller, emerging funds (e.g Fondo de Ahorro de Panama, Timor Leste Petroleum 
Fund) did not have the critical mass to embrace effectively these new investment 
models and stuck with conventional LP arrangements. Stabilization funds (such as 
Chile’s Economic and Social Stabilization Fund) instead are constrained by their 
mandate to maintain a risk profile incompatible with a significant allocation to 
private equity and alternatives. As it will be shown in the descriptive analysis, the 
evolution that we document in this report regards primarily large, savings funds with 
a long track record of investments. However, a penchant in favor of collaborative 
investing is developing amongst strategic investment funds and SWFs with a 
developmental focus, supporting the broad relevance of our conclusions. 
SWF have progressively increased 
the resort to cooperative investment 
models following strategies consistent 
with the recently observed trend of 
disintermediation of financial markets 
and surge in direct equity investment.
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Delegation and co-operation: 
towards a taxonomy of 
investment models
As we mentioned earlier, typically SWFs as most global institutional investors have 
embraced alternatives using the conventional LP model depicted in Exhibit 1. The 
SWF commits a given amount of capital to a private equity fund managed by a 
professional GP, which is paid in as long as investment opportunities arise. The SWF 
as LP pays management fees and gets its share of profits over the life time of the 
fund, which is often spans several years.
The LP arrangement epitomizes the full 
delegation model of investment in private 
markets, with SWF playing the role of pure 
passive providers of capital. Direct equity 
investment, broadly defined as acquisition 
of stakes in target firms without any layer of 
external intermediation, lies at the other side 
of the spectrum, and is increasingly becoming 
common practice in the institutional investor 
sphere (Fang et al., 2015). 
02
The LP arrangement epitomizes the 
full delegation model of investment 
in private markets, with SWF playing 
the role of pure passive providers of 
capital.
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Exhibit 1 | Dealmaking in private markets
The LP model
GP
Fund
Investor (LP) Portfolio company (A)
SWF (LP) Portfolio company (B)
Investment platforms
GP 
(private or SWF)
Fund
Investor
SWF I
SWF II
Portfolio company (A)
Portfolio company (B)
The direct investment model
Investor Portfolio company (A)
SWF Portfolio company (B)
The co-investment model
GP
Fund
Investor (LP) Portfolio company (A)
SWF (LP) Portfolio company (B)
Source: Sovereign Investment Lab, Bocconi University
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Direct equity investments come in 
different forms, with varying degree 
of direct exposure and delegation to 
third party managers. Among the many 
possible models, co-investments stick 
out as the closer to conventional LP, 
private equity arrangements. In this 
type of deals, the investor (limited 
partner or LP) co-invests alongside the 
GP in a given target, taking on slightly 
more risk in return for reduced fees. 
The benefits from co-investments stem 
from J-curve mitigation (i.e. making 
returns less negative in the early years 
before the portfolio of companies 
matures), more flexibility and control in 
portfolio construction, better ability to 
time the market and customize the risk 
exposures. Co-investments, however, 
also have downsides. The GP will 
invite a co-investor into larger deals, 
which tend to underperform (Lopez de 
Silanes et al., 2015). More importantly, 
the GP will often leave only a limited 
amount of time to undertake due 
diligence, which exposes the co-
investor to a classical adverse selection 
problem, with the poor performance of 
low-quality deals offsetting the reduced 
cost. Finally, SWF still rely almost 
entirely on the deal partner to drive 
value creation, limiting skill building 
and learning.
In spite of these potential risks, many SWFs have embraced co-investment 
strategies, but they have also sought to improve the model to benefit from 
additional tactical benefits, such as building stronger relationships with managers, 
accumulating greater information about investments, and increasing their internal 
teams’ investment experience. From this perspective, co-investments represent an 
intermediary step into fully fledged direct equity investment, to carry out alone, or 
more significantly, in collaboration with partners.
Along this path towards enhanced cooperation, SWFs 
have recently teamed up with other sovereign investors 
or strategic partners to form investment platforms, namely 
funds or joint ventures operating with a specific focus or 
mandate. Platforms resemble LP arrangements in that 
they still involve a significant amount of delegation and 
intermediation by GPs. SWFs, however, are not any longer 
the passive players envisaged in the conventional LP model 
but the main joint lead/sponsor and anchor investors of the 
platforms.
Co-investments represent 
an intermediary step into 
fully fledged direct equity 
investment, to carry out 
alone, or more significantly, 
in collaboration with 
partners.
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This broad definition of investment platform encompasses different fund structures 
and contractual arrangements. A first type of platform is the FDI Attraction Fund in 
which one or more SWFs commits capital to a closed-end fund investing in a given 
country, as a way to facilitate foreign direct investment. Notable, recent cases are 
the joint venture recently announced between the China Investment Corporation 
(CIC) and French bank-BNP Paribas with France private equity firm Eurazeo as 
asset manager and the China-US Industrial Cooperation Partnership sponsored by 
Goldman Sachs with CIC as anchor investor.
A second type is the G2G Investment Fund, promoted by two or more SWFs (or 
government controlled entities) with the aim to promote investments and bilateral 
commercial links. The many joint initiatives of the Russian Direct Investment Fund, 
Italian Cdp Equity’s joint venture with Qatar Investment Authority and Kuwait 
Investment Authority, and Ireland Strategic Investment Fund recently launched 
China-Ireland Technology Growth Fund fall in this category. While the main objective 
of FDI Attraction Funds is commercial return, the second type being strongly 
promoted by incumbent governments are also a tool to foster economic diplomacy 
and bilateral cooperation along with investments. 
A third and final type of platform is the Sectoral Investment Fund, in which one or 
more SWFs commit capital to invest in a specific sector often alongside a GP with 
specialized knowledge and expertise. The Vision Fund, the $100 billion platform 
focused on IT investment sponsored by Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund (PIF) 
and managed by Japanese technology investor Softbank, is one of most prominent 
cases of these new arrangements.
13
The last stage in the evolution of SWFs’ approach to private markets is full-fledged, 
direct equity investing. In a direct solo investment, the SWF sources and executes 
the transactions on its own, bypassing the GP and thus pays no fees or carry. In a 
direct investment partnership, the SWF co-invests with a strategic partner (such as a 
venture fund, or infrastructure or real estate operator) or with other like-minded 
investors (other SWFs, pension funds or insurance companies), or a combination of 
both. Direct investment partnerships are thus genuine jointly sponsored deals. GIC 
and logistics provider GLP partnered together in 2014 to acquire IndCor, one of the 
largest industrial real estate providers in the US, for $8.1 billion from Blackstone. 
Khazahah and Temasek created a strategic joint-venture, M+S, to develop two 
substantial real estate projects in Singapore.
Our taxonomy, shown in Exhibit 2, is thus complete. In a quest to overcome the 
conventional LP model, SWFs can position themselves along a range of investment 
strategies in decreasing order of delegation to third-party managers as they move 
from pure co-investments to investment platforms and partnerships. The transition 
entails a learning process where SWFs adjust their capabilities and skill sets.
In the old world of private equity, SWFs’ main task as an LP was manager selection. 
In the game of direct equity investing, different competences are needed. An SWF’s 
internal staff must be trained and experienced in transaction related activities, 
including due diligence, operational and monitoring capabilities that are outside 
the traditional LP skill set. In sourcing the right team is a serious organizational 
challenge, entailing additional costs and new risks. That is why, as SWFs move away 
from full delegation models and embark on direct equity investment, they enhance 
cooperation to pool capabilities and skills with strategic investment partners. In 
this evolutionary process involving investment models, collaborative direct equity 
investing becomes a rational response to disintermediation. 
In this evolutionary process involving investment 
models, collaborative direct equity investing becomes a 
rational response to disintermediation.
Exhibit 2 | Investment models in private markets
Cooperation
Low Moderate High
D
el
eg
at
io
n Low
Direct Solo 
Investments
Direct Investment 
partnerships
Moderate Co-investments
High LP model Investment platforms 
Source: Sovereign Investment Lab, Bocconi University
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SWF investments in private 
markets
The main source of data published in this report is the SIL’s Global SWF Transactions 
Database, one of the most comprehensive sources of global sovereign equity 
investment (see Appendix 1 for a detailed description). The database reports 2,895 
transactions from 2000 to 2018, representing an aggregated deal value of over 
US883bn. In this analysis, due to limited data availability about less recent deals, we 
restrict the sample period to 2009-2018. 
Since 2009, our data show that SWF poured into equity markets new investments 
worth $585bn. In fact, this figure excludes the allocation to equity that is typically 
carried out by third parties fund managers operating in public markets on behalf 
of SWF. Our data however are a good starting point to identify total investments in 
private markets given by the sum of direct equity investments in unlisted firms and 
“alternatives” as broadly defined in the introduction. 
Historically, SWF have been investing heavily in private markets. The number of 
transactions reported in this category is 1.748 for a total deal value of $433bn. In the 
aftermath of the global financial crisis, however, the share of deals in this space has 
increased, rising from 73 per cent in 2009 to 89 per cent in 2018, reaching a peak in 
2017 with 212 deals. Direct equity investments in listed firms in the second part of 
the decade declined, as a response to deep, structural changes taking place in global 
financial markets after the crisis. 
By flooring interest rates, and purchasing unprecedented quantities of securities 
in the marketplace, all main central banks outcompeted one another in the 
implementation of unconventional monetary policies, fueling an abnormal increase 
in equity prices and creating an ultra-low yields environment. In the last decade, 
the US S&P 500 stock index quadrupled in value, Japan’s Nikkei 225 would triple, 
followed closely by Hong Kong’s Hang Seng index. The subdued economic growth 
under the new normal combined with US corporate tax cuts induced companies to 
launch a large share buyback in order to boost returns, contributing to the equity 
boom. The elevated cost of capital in the financial market contributed to process that 
cut in half the number of publicly listed companies in the US, with significant decline 
in major developed markets. In the course of the last decade, public markets have 
become overtly expensive, less liquid, and more volatile. SWFs flocked with other 
like-minded financial institution into private markets, in a quest for better returns. 
FIGURE 1 | SWF investments in private markets
Private markets (deals) Listed firms (deals)
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
03
Source: Sovereign Investment Lab, Bocconi University
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The distribution of private markets investments by asset class reveals that private 
equity (defined as the sum of direct investments in unlisted targets and private 
equity funds) gets the lion share with about 60 per cent of deals and investment 
value, followed by real estate in the 20-25 per cent range. Venture capital, broadly 
grouping investments at various stages in technological companies, ranges in total 
from 8 to 14 per cent by value and deals, respectively.
The aggregate data, however, mask some interesting dynamics taking place in the 
last decade in the individual asset classes. A first noteworthy trend is the impressive 
surge of investment value in real estate immediately after the crisis and until the 
record year 2015, when property attracted 50 per cent of total SWF investment in 
private markets. The real estate binge, however, came quite abruptly to a close 
as the sector remained almost completely under the radar screen in the last 
three years.
A second, related, fact is the staggering 
increase in venture capital investments. 
Since the mid of the sample period, SWF 
progressively and consistently increased 
the private market allocation to technology 
companies, fully embracing disruptive 
innovation as one of the main investment 
FIGURE 2 | SWF investments in private markets by asset class
Infrastructure Real Estate Private Equity Venture Capital
8% 6%
26%
14%
4%
20%
62%60%
Share of value Share of deals
In the course of the last decade, 
public markets have become overtly 
expensive, less liquid, and more 
volatile.
Source: Sovereign Investment Lab, Bocconi University 17
FIGURE 3 | SWF investments in private markets by asset class
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themes. Venture capital investment, barely existing as an asset class SWFs’ portfolio 
at the beginning of the sample period, ended up to account for 40 per cent of 
total deals.
Private equity to some extent retrenched during the real estate boom, but remained 
a solid pillar of private markets throughout the period. Infrastructure instead was 
kept underweight in SWF portfolio, even though a significant uptick is observed in 
the most recent years. 
04
Source: Sovereign Investment Lab, Bocconi University
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Applying the taxonomy: 
deal types and trends in 
investment models
Private markets have thus been gaining ground recently. In order to understand the 
details of this evolution, and how SWFs have approached this space, we apply the 
taxonomy of investment models developed in section 2. 
At the aggregate level, SWF have typically tapped private markets via solo direct 
equity investments and direct equity partnerships, accounting for about a 43 and 37 
percent of deals, respectively. Conventional LP investments are found in 12 per cent 
of cases, while co-investments and platforms are marginal, accounting in total for 
about 7 per cent. The breakdown of dollar values shows a consistent picture, with the 
two main categories (solo and direct equity partnerships) getting a 91 per cent share 
of total investment. As to LP investment, however, a caveat is in order. As already 
mentioned in the data description, our source identifies SWF’s investments as LP but 
in several cases does not report the actual commitment, so as a consequence our 
analysis of deal value will underestimate the relevance of SWF investment in private 
equity funds. In what follows, therefore, more emphasis will be placed on activity in 
term of number of deals. 
FIGURE 4 | SWF investment in private markets by deal types
Direct Equity Partnerships Investment Platforms LP
Direct SoloCoinvestments
29%
37%
3%
3%
5%12%
43%
2%
4%
62%
Share of value Share of deals
The evolution over time in the distribution of deal types 
reveals that a major shift occurred in SWF approach to 
private markets over the last decade. Funds gradually but 
consistently replaced direct solo investments with direct 
equity partnerships and the outcome is quite striking. The 
snapshots taken in 2009 and 2018 show that the shares 
of these two deal types almost flipped: direct equity 
partnerships increased from 19 to 61 per cent of total deals, 
while solo collapsed from 69 to 21 per cent over the same 
period, revealing a complete change of strategy in the 
direct equity space. 
04
The evolution over time in 
the distribution of deal types 
reveals that funds gradually 
but consistently replaced 
direct solo investments with 
direct equity partnerships.
Source: Sovereign Investment Lab, Bocconi University
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FIGURE 5 | The evolution of SWF investment in private markets by type
Direct Equity Partnerships Investment Platforms LP Direct SoloCoinvestments
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The data on LP and co-investments are also interesting. In the sample period, SWFs 
limited, albeit slightly, their investments as LPs from 11 to 7 per cent of total deals, 
while increasing co-investments from virtually zero to 10 per cent. Our readers would 
recall that amongst the collaborative models, co-investments entail a significant 
delegation to GP in deal origination and execution and as such are the “closer” 
model to conventional LP investing. Our data therefore suggest that the overall 
share of deals with private equity funds remained broadly constant overtime, but co-
investments gained an increasing market share. With $12bn of total value since 2009, 
platforms represent an innovative investment model which gained ground especially 
in the 2012-2014, reaching a 3 per cent average share of deals in the last years.
Source: Sovereign Investment Lab, Bocconi University
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The data on investment values are broadly consistent with the number of deals and 
support a first important conclusion. Collaborative investing, particularly in the 
form of direct equity partnership, is the new, emerging investment pattern on SWF 
operations in private markets, accounting in 2018 for a staggering 79 and 68 per cent 
of total deals and value, respectively.
While we observe a significant resilience of conventional private equity models, 
the reported investments values suggest that SWF have shown in the last three 
years a commitment to test the co-investment model as an alternative, maybe less 
expensive entry into private markets. In 2018, co-investments deals are worth for 
$7.9bn, accounting for 22 per cent of total value. 
Our analysis of investment models in private market 
suggests that SWFs increased their exposure to 
direct equity investment with a twist: sharing risks 
and benefits with partners. It may be again useful 
to put this fact into the broader perspective of the 
post-crisis financial system. Forced by regulation and 
market pressure, since 2009 the banking industry 
has embarked in a deep deleveraging process, 
increasing capital cushions and cleaning up balance 
sheets. Global systemically important banks have 
been thus pulled down from excessive short-term risk taking and pushed into safer 
grounds. As El Erian (2016) pointed out, this process did not eliminate systemic risk. 
Rather, it just morphed and migrated out of banks into other sectors of the financial 
industry. A structural outcome of this mass migration of risk is the shrinking role of 
conventional, broker-dealer bank sponsored, intermediation and the increasing role 
of non-bank end users of capital, including pension funds, insurers, and SWFs. The 
shift towards direct equity that we have observed among is thus part and parcel of a 
wider, structural change in the global financial system, with far reaching implications 
for SWFs and institutional investors alike.
The overall share of deals with 
private equity funds remained 
broadly constant overtime, 
but co-investments gained an 
increasing market share.
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Disentangling private markets: 
deal types by asset class
With more than a quarter of trillion of investments, private equity is the most 
significant asset class within alternatives, or private markets portfolio of SWFs. In 
this bucket, our data on activity based on deals show a remarkable transition in 
direct equity investment from solo to partnerships. Solo investment accounted for a 
staggering two thirds of deals in 2009, and progressively reduced to about one fourth 
in the last year. Conversely, the share of direct equity partnerships tripled in the 
sample period, reaching a stellar 55 per cent in 2018. Indeed, a total value of $14bn 
was poured into these partnerships in 2018, becoming by far the most popular SWF 
investment model in private equity. The conventional LP model gained relevance in 
the early years of the sample, but progressively lost market shares since 2014. In 2018, 
investments in private equity funds accounted only for 13 per cent of total deals.
The data shows a clear trend of rising co-investments in private equity. SWFs have 
progressively embraced this new investment model, which has reached a 7 per 
center share of total deals over the last years. The dollar values of these deals have 
to be taken with some grain of salt, but in 2018 co-investments have been reported 
at a staggering 22 per cent of the total $7.9bn. As we mentioned already, the co-
investment model represents a “soft landing” into direct equity, and the numbers 
suggest that SWFs are testing with this model in earnest, in spite of its inherent 
risks. SWFs have also been wary to continue sponsoring investment platforms in the 
private equity space, after the experiments carried out in 2014 and 2015, when they 
accounted for 15 per cent of activity by deals.
FIGURE 6 | SWF investment in private equity
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Source: Sovereign Investment Lab, Bocconi University
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With 342 deals worth in total $111bn, real estate is the second largest asset class 
by SWF investment within the private markets bucket. The most interesting trend 
surfacing in this industry is the complete exit from the conventional LP models. 
Apparently, SWFs of all stripes have turned away from investing in real estate funds 
and moved towards direct equity investments in this asset class, especially using 
the partnership model. While right after the financial crisis property funds were 
capturing more than 50 per cent of investment value and about 40 per cent of deals, 
last year investments via real estate asset managers shrunk to only 5 per cent in 
value. In combination with a significant contraction of investment flows in the sector 
we are thus observing to a greater extent than in other private markets a full-fledged 
disintermediation processes, with SWFs dumping LP models in favor of direct equity 
investments both in terms of solo and, more recently, of partnerships with like-
minded investors or specialized property operators. Co-investments do not appear 
a suitable investment model in this space, and the same holds for platforms that, in 
spite of a limited surge in activities in 2012-13, never really took off. 
FIGURE 7 | SWF investment in real estate
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As widely recognized, technology has been the sector of choice for global SWFs in the 
second part of the last decade. SWFs flocked into this industry in earnest, executing 
251 deals worth $37bn. As figure 6 shows, the pace of acceleration has been 
impressive, turning sovereign investors into venture capitalist in a span of only a few 
years. Interestingly, SWFs’ entry into this space has not followed the conventional 
route of LP investments in VC funds, but rather resorting to the new models of 
collaborative investments, namely direct equity partnerships and co-investments. 
Indeed, these two deal types account for 66 and 36 per cent of total deals and value 
in technology respectively, with an increasing share throughout the period. According 
to our data, venture capital is the asset class within private markets where the 
co-investment model has been more seriously tested. The average ticket size of co-
investments has been well above the $500ml threshold and in total are worth $10bn, 
with a strong concentration in the last three years. As in real estate, investment 
platforms has not been widely used. However, the picture would be completely 
different if we included the Vision Fund, the $100bn investment platform sponsored 
by Saudi’s PIF and managed by Masayoshi Son’s Softbank. As explained in the below 
sidebar, there are good reasons to analyze it separately.
FIGURE 8 | SWF investment in venture capital 
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UNDERSTANDING SOFTBANK’S VISION FUND
The largest VC/tech fund ever raised, 
Softbank Vision Fund was established by 
Softbank Group, with a focus on providing 
large-scale, long-term investments in next-gen 
innovating companies and platform 
businesses. Target investments mainly 
include growth-stage companies in tech, 
including IoT, AI, robotics, etc., with an 
investment period limited to five years, and 
a fund’s lifecycle expected to last about 
12 years. 
With its $100bn capital, starting in 2018 the 
Vision Fund has dramatically changed the 
global dynamics of investing in technology, 
giving access to a handful of large global 
investors to unique large-scale tech deals and 
opportunities. At the same time, the Fund has 
given its LPs the opportunity to invest 
significantly large amounts of capital in a 
relatively difficult asset class and within a very 
short timeframe; this is particularly 
remarkable given the market conditions and 
the pressure to generate high returns. Main 
LPs include Public Investment Fund of Saudi 
Arabia ($45bn), Softbank Group Corp. 
($28bn), Mubadala ($15bn), and Apple ($1bn).
Despite its uniquely large scale and the 
relatively short time span, the Vision Fund 
has already deployed around 70% of its 
capital, actively investing across Asia, 
Americas and EMEA, with a total of 77 
investments in 65 companies completed until 
today. The majority of investments completed 
so far have focused on VC financing across 
different stages of maturity, with 56 VC 
investments out of the 77 in total completed 
(the remainder primarily across growth, 
corporate and secondary). 
While providing a unique opportunity to gain 
exposure to tech investments through the LP/
GP relationship, the Fund has also proven to 
be a strong platform for LPs to co-invest 
alongside SoftBank, effectively doubling-down 
on attractive investment opportunities while 
leveraging SoftBank’s sector expertise and 
access. In fact, 58 out of the 77 deals 
completed so far by the Vision Fund have 
multiple investors, mostly with SoftBank in 
the lead. An interesting example of this is the 
2018 investment in ParkJockey, a parking 
technology solutions provider, that secured 
funding from the SoftBank Group. Later the 
same year, ParkJockey and Mubadala have 
partnered to acquire Atlanta-based Citizens 
Parking Inc, and have agreed to acquire 
Imperial Parking Corporation (deal expected 
to close in the first half of 2019). This 
approach has given Mubadala the opportunity 
to further deploy capital, building on 
SoftBank’s pipeline and access, while 
reducing risk exposure through SoftBank’s 
sector expertise.
CASE STUDY
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FIGURE 9 | SWF investment in infrastructure
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With high risk-adjusted yields, underlying physical assets, and sizable economic 
spillovers, infrastructure fits nicely with the investment preferences of SWFs. In 
practice, however, the total investment in this sector has been quite limited, even 
it is gaining momentum in the last years. We report in total 75 deals worth $27bn, 
of which almost 60 per cent executed in the last four years. The distribution of deal 
types in this asset class is completely skewed in favor of direct equity, with an equal 
split between solo and partnerships, which as in many other private markets, have 
become the prevailing model for SWF to approaching private markets. 
Source: Sovereign Investment Lab, Bocconi University
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The geography of private 
markets
A first, broad distinction to be made when analyzing the geographical pattern of SWF 
investments in private markets is between domestic and international deals. Indeed, 
these two categories of operations are carried out with different objectives, with 
foreign investment primarily aimed at portfolio diversification and financial returns, 
while investment at home often focused to support the local economy in bad times 
or to boost long-term investment and socio-economic development.
In private markets as in other asset class, foreign deals are largely predominant 
and account for 80 per cent of total transactions and for 79 per cent of reported 
deal value. The international profile of investments seems however to matter also in 
terms of the investment model chosen. Indeed, when investing directly abroad, SWFs 
tend to evenly split deals between solo and equity partnerships. At home, instead 
they have a much stronger preference to direct solo investments. This different 
behavior can be explained in terms of better access to information and investment 
opportunities in the local market, so that SWFs can more easily source and execute 
deals at home. Direct equity partnership instead are more valuable in distant 
markets, where the collaboration with an experienced partner can mitigate adverse 
selection and boost returns.
In what follows, we try to look in more detail where SWFs are investing when they 
seek opportunities in private markets. First, the bulk of investments is concentrated 
in three main regions, namely Europe, Pacific Asia, and North America, accounting 
for three quarters of total activity by deals and dollar value. Europe is particularly 
relevant in terms of value, reporting one third of the total, while Pacific Asia reports 
31 per cent of deals. North America attracts around 18 per cent of private market 
investments by both measures of activity. Private markets in other regions are 
under the radar screen of SWFs, with the exception 
of Non Pacific Asia and MENA, surpassing albeit 
slightly the 10 per cent share in term of deals and 
value, respectively. The regional distribution over 
time looks quite stable, even if we report some 
recent uptick in favor of Pacific Asia over the last 
three years. In the same period, Europe has gained 
ground in terms of investment value, while North 
America in terms of transactions. 
06
When investing directly abroad, 
SWFs tend to evenly split 
deals between solo and equity 
partnerships. At home, instead 
they have a much stronger 
preference to direct solo 
investments.
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FIGURE 10 | Private markets by deal type at home and abroad
Against this backdrop, the geography of private markets is certainly interesting to put our 
deal type analysis in perspective. The aggregate data suggest that even when investing in 
different destinations, SWF typically chose direct equity rather than resorting to financial 
intermediaries as private equity funds. The regional comparison, however, highlights 
significant differences in the use of collaborative investment models such as direct equity 
partnerships. This deal type is much more frequently found in Asia (both Pacific and 
Non-Pacific) and North America, where it accounts for more than 40 per cent of overall 
transactions. Latin America and the MENA region instead tend to favor direct equity solo. 
Quite systematic differences surface when regions are compared according to the relevance of 
the conventional, intermediated LP model. In this space, the three main destinations by value 
of SWF investments, namely Europe, Asia Pacific, and North America are in stark contrast 
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with the rest, displaying a share of LP deals well above 10 per cent, with Europe well 
above 20 per cent. The data on the regional distribution of investments by value are 
broadly consistent with this picture, even if they enhanced the economic relevance of 
co-investments in some regions such as Asia Pacific, Europe and the US. 
FIGURE 11 | SWF investment in private markets by regions
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FIGURE 12 | Private markets deal types by regions
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Previous sections of this report have clearly shown that dramatic transition are 
underway in SWF approach to private markets. It is thus interesting to look at the 
evolution of investment models within the main target regions, possibly identifying 
commonalities and differences across destinations, starting from Asia Pacific.
In this region, the data show a stark decline of direct equity investment in favor of 
partnerships, which have become the predominant deal type in the last years. After 
a robust growth at the beginning of the period, SWFs have instead lost appetite in 
conventional private equity funds, while testing in earnest the co-investment model. 
Indeed, this new deal type has progressively increased its market share in the last 
years, reaching a total of $4.1bn of investment value in 2017-18. 
We now turn to the second largest target region, Europe. Broadly speaking, the 
reported trends are the same as in Asia, but the rate of change is different. Indeed, 
FIGURE 13 | SWF investment in private markets in Asia Pacific
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direct equity has been overcome by the quite impressive growth of partnerships. Yet, 
the former deal type, especially when measured in dollar terms, has remained a solid 
pillar in private markets also in the most recent years, while it lost ground in Asia. 
Similarly, the LP model, which grew spectacularly at the beginning of the decade 
contracted quite severely in the last years. The same marked increasing trend of co-
investments is also observed in Europe, but here their growth has been even more 
spectacular, accounting for a staggering 40 per cent of total investment value.
The end points of these different temporal patters is not dramatically different 
between Asia and Europe, with one important exception. European private markets 
have remained accessible via solo direct equity. Successful entry in Asia requires 
instead either professional managers or knowledgeable strategic partners.
FIGURE 14 | SWF investment in private markets in Europe
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A regional analysis would not be complete without North America, home of the 
largest target country of SWF investments, the United States. The evolution of the 
investment patterns in the region has been to some extent similar to Asia. The rise 
of direct equity partnership has been staggering across the Pacific as well, while the 
contraction of LP deals much more pronounced. SWFs investing in this region have 
been more wary to embrace the co-investment model. 
As already noticed, SWF investments in private markets in the other macro-regions 
have been quite marginal over the last decade. Unreported data shows however that 
in Non-Pacific Asia the partnership model gained ground as in the other regions, 
FIGURE 15 | SWF investment in private markets in North America
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while in Latin America, MENA and South Saharan Africa solo investments are the 
default deal type.
Finally, we take the perspective from home countries and try to understand how SWF 
from specific regions are approaching private markets. As a preliminary analysis, we 
break SWF investments by region of investing entity to understand their relevance as 
a source of funds. In terms of deals in private markets, Asia dwarfs all other regions, 
accounting for 62 per cent, followed by MENA reporting a share of 33 per cent. The 
third region by deals, Europe, reports only a small 5 per cent. The data on deal value 
provide a more nuanced picture, with exactly a half of investments originating from 
Asia, and the MENA share rising significantly to 42 per cent.
These data are certainly not surprising and reflect the widely recognized relevance 
of SWFs established in trade surplus countries such as China and Singapore and in 
the resource rich nations of the Gulf. More interesting, from our point of view, is the 
evolution over time of the relative positions of these two economic blocs.
Figure 17 highlights a dramatic change in the share of SWF investment value from 
Asia, from 22 per cent in 2009 to a staggering 71 per cent in 2019, with percentages 
for MENA regions flipping over the same period. The new “age of plenty” in 
commodities market which brought down oil prices since 2013 had redistributive 
effects between exporting and importing nations, and different implications for 
commodity as opposed to surplus, non-commodity SWFs. While low prices strain 
the fiscal position of exporters and their growth prospects, they lower energy costs 
for countries that are net importers, strengthening 
the competitive position. One would expect a boost 
in exports for large energy consumers especially 
amongst emerging countries, leading to significant 
accumulation of reserves, while an opposite trend 
should be observed in resource rich countries, 
forced to tap sovereign assets to support their 
battered economies.
In spite of their diversity in term 
of volume of activity in private 
markets, the distribution of deal 
types among the key regions is 
remarkably similar.
FIGURE 16 | SWF investments in private markets by home region
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In spite of their diversity in term of volume of activity in private markets, the 
distribution of deal types among the key regions is remarkably similar. Direct equity 
partnerships are reported in the range of 40 per cent across all regions, and very 
similar figures (around 20 per cent) are found in Asia and Europe for the share of 
conventional LP deals. MENA funds stick out in terms of the preference afforded 
to direct solo investments, accounting for more than a half of deals. Interestingly, 
co-investments have been almost entirely developed by Asian funds, and never 
seriously tested by funds from other geographies. The same holds for platforms, 
which originated almost exclusively in Asia. 
Dollar value data provide a quite consistent picture for Asia, amplifying the 
economic relevance of the $17bn co-investments in the region, accounting for 8 per 
cent of total investments. MENA SWFs’ strong penchant towards direct equity is 
confirmed. The limited investments carried out by European SWFs display a quite 
different deal type distribution by value, suggesting solo direct equity as the most 
widely used investment model.
As usual, the data about the evolution over time of deal type preferences reveal 
interesting facts also within individual regions. Quite strikingly, in spite of two 
completely diverging trends of overall investment in private markets, with Asia 
picking up strongly in the last years, and MENA retrenching, the distribution over 
time among investment models is very similar, suggesting that neither geography, 
nor macroeconomic outlook matter much in explaining how deal making in private 
markets evolved in recent times. Structural factors have changed the industry 
and steadily shifting incentives in favor of collaborative investment models 
predominantly in the form of direct equity partnerships and against solo and 
conventional LP models. On a similar vein, co-investments have gained ground 
recently in the two most important regions for global SWF investment. Any clearly 
discernible pattern is instead visible in the SWF deals originating from Europe, 
maybe due to the scant activity also reflected in our data. 
 
FIGURE 17 | SWF investments in private markets by home region
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FIGURE 18 | Investments in private markets 
Source: Sovereign Investment Lab, Bocconi University
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Sectoral analysis
The breakdown by sector reveals some interesting patterns of SWF investment in 
private markets. Probably one of the most striking fact is the whopping concentration 
in the financial sector and in real estate, accounting for about a half of overall deal 
activity. The financial industry gets a share of 27 and 19 per cent of deals and value, 
respectively, while the property market gains more relevance measured by dollar 
value of investment, boasting a share of 23 per cent raised in $101bn worth of deals. 
Average ticket size consistently show that deals in real estate tend to be much larger 
than in the financial sector. Banks have been historically a target of choice for SWF. 
The relevance of financial sector in our data on private markets, however, can also 
be enhanced by the classification of SWF operations in private equity funds into this 
bucket, independent of the actual sectoral destination of investments.
The other main target is the transport sector, accounting for 5 per cent of deals 
and 11 per cent of investment value. One quarter of investment value (slightly less 
by deal) is evenly split in four sectors, namely personal and business services, 
infrastructure, chemicals and oil&gas. Out of these main sectors, SWF investment 
activity looks widely diversified, with all other sectors well below the 2 per cent 
threshold of investment value.
But how did the sectoral allocation in private markets change over the last decade? 
Again, our yearly data reveal that a seismic change unfolded throughout the period. 
The overall equity investment activity measured both in deal counts and dollar 
value highlights the unfolding of three distinct, albeit related, trends: the lost SWFs’ 
appetite for the financial industry, the real estate binge in the first half the decade, 
and the amazing rise in personal and business services. Taking into account that this 
label flags the lion share of SWF investments carried out in the technology sector, 
we can conclude that a major shift has occurred in SWF private markets in favor of 
disruptive technology, venture capital deals as already documented in our analysis 
by asset classes. While in the 2009-2018 period the share of investments in banks 
fell from 32 to 10 per cent, services grew from 4 to 38 per cent, hitting the record of 
$17.6bn in 2016. SWF investment in property boomed initially, and then progressively 
declined, even if in the last year with $8.4bn it remained the sector of choice. 
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FIGURE 19 | SWF investments in private markets by target sector
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We conclude our sectoral analysis by begging these questions: in which sectors 
have collaborative investment models been applied more successfully? And more 
particularly, do we observe any systematic association between deal types and 
specific industries? Our data allows to draw some rather sharp conclusions. The 
sector where direct equity partnerships and co-investments have been most 
successfully executed by SWFs is business services (a.k.a. technology), where they 
account for 70 per cent of investment activity in the industry. In particular, the 
$10.2bn co-investments represent one fourth of total reported value. Real estate 
and infrastructure also are worth mentioning, with about 50 per cent of investment 
activity carried out via direct equity partnerships. The sectoral analysis of LP model 
is not particularly meaningful given the above mentioned classification issue of 
private equity fund investments. With this proviso, with the exception of a few deals 
in real estate, infrastructure and oil&gas, the conventional LP model appear quite 
under the SWFs’ radar screens also across sectors. 
FIGURE 20 | SWF investments in private markets by target sector
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FIGURE 21 | SWF investment in target sectos by deal type
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The decline of private 
equity funds?
Private equity dealmaking has soared to levels unseen since the financial crisis 
and the buyout boom does not show signs of stopping. According to Preqin, private 
equity shops have been accumulating dry powder that is estimated above $2trn. Yet, 
our data suggest that SWFs did not herd onto the asset class but adopted a more 
cautious approach. SWFs are realizing that in order to create extra value for their 
stakeholders, they cannot just rely on passively committing capital to private equity 
funds. SWFs thus shifted strategies towards insourcing and developing of internal 
capabilities. This key goals, coupled with the high fees typically charged by fund 
managers, have induced SWFs to pull the brakes on the conventional LP model. 
Nonetheless, it must be acknowledged, our data on LP investments are scant and 
less systematic as deal information is usually not publicly available. As a result, the 
relative weight of this investment strategy might be underestimated. 
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TABLE 1 | The league table of SWF limited partnerships
Top 10 deals
SWF Target Country Year Sector
Value 
USD MM Partners
China Investment 
Corporation (CIC)
Goldman Sachs 
Distressed Assets Fund
USA 2009 Banking, 
Insurance, Trading
1,000.00 Goldman Sachs
China Investment 
Corporation (CIC)
Apax Europe VII UK 2010 Banking, 
Insurance, Trading
886.48 Apax Partners
Future Fund Apax Partners 
Permanent Capital 
Vehicle
UK 2009 Banking, 
Insurance, Trading
490.70 Apax Partners
GIC Pte Ltd Apax Partners 
Permanent Capital 
Vehicle
UK 2009 Banking, 
Insurance, Trading
490.70 Apax Partners
China Investment 
Corporation (CIC)
Apax VIII LP UK 2012 Banking, 
Insurance, Trading
396.56 Apax Partners
Future Fund Apax VIII LP UK 2012 Banking, 
Insurance, Trading
396.56 Apax Partners
GIC Pte Ltd Apax VIII LP UK 2012 Banking, 
Insurance, Trading
396.56 Apax Partners
China Investment 
Corporation (CIC)
Carlyle Partners VI USA 2014 Banking, 
Insurance, Trading
350.00 Carlyle Partners
China Investment 
Corporation (CIC)
Apax Partners 
Permanent Capital 
Vehicle
UK 2009 Banking, 
Insurance, Trading
293.15 Apax Partners
New Zealand 
Superannuation Fund 
KKR Australia USA 2014 Infrastructure & 
Utilities
250.00 KKR Australia
FIGURE 22 | LP investments
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With this caveat, our data show that LP investments have lost their importance in 
both absolute and relative terms. In 2009, SWFs had invested around $2.5 billion as 
LPs which represented 4% of total invested value. Ten years later that value dropped 
to just $75 million which represents only 0.21% of total invested value.
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Limited partnerships and 
beyond: testing the 
co-investment model
Co-investments represent a hybrid model combining the traditional LP strategy with 
direct investing, allowing SWFs to benefit from building a closer relationship with the 
PE firm which can be leveraged to develop internal capabilities. 
In the observed period we record a total of $19.7 billion of co-investments which 
represents around 5% of overall private markets investment value. Although this 
number might seem negligible compared to the $433 billion invested in private 
markets, the growth of pure co-investments has been remarkable. In 2018, capital 
deployed through co-investments was 11 times higher compared to 2010. In the 
same year, investments through this model represented 22% of total private market 
investments, whereas their share in 2010 was just 2%. The number of co-investments 
has also been rising rapidly: on average we record a 118% annual increase in the 
number of deals classified as co-investments. It must be noted, however, that the 
same data availability issues affecting LP investments apply also co-investments so 
that the reported figures represent a conservative estimate of the actual numbers.
Many SWFs have positioned technology investing as 
a key pillar in their future plan and strategy, however, 
at least at this point in time, most of them lack the 
necessary knowledge and experience. In order to 
bridge this gap, SWFs have extensively utilized co-
investments in the technology sector. A remarkable 
51% of invested value through co-investments has 
been placed in high-tech target companies. Some 
notable examples are: GIC partnering with The Carlyle 
Group to acquire Veritas Technologies for $7.4 billion, 
Mubadala investing in Uber’s Chinese challenger Didi 
and a number of pure venture deals by Temasek.
Co-investments represent a 
hybrid model combining the 
traditional LP strategy with 
direct investing, allowing SWFs 
to benefit from building a 
closer relationship with the PE 
firm which can be leveraged to 
develop internal capabilities.
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FIGURE 23 | Coinvestments
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TEMASEK’S LONG JOURNEY IN PRIVATE MARKETS
Singapore’s Temasek Holdings has pursued 
a very effective collaborative investment 
strategy, advancing along a trajectory that 
has enabled it to significantly advancing 
internal capabilities and exposure to private 
markets. 
Already before the financial crisis, about 
25% of Temasek’s private-market portfolio 
consisted of pure co-investments (i.e. deals 
where Temasek was not the sole or lead 
partner in the deal, but which had a lead PE 
fund partner). In these early stages, 
Temasek’s investments outside Asia 
accounted for only 20% of their total activity. 
As the fund’s model and risk appetite 
evolved, Temasek started to become more 
active in the co-investments and direct 
investment space (i.e. all private-equity and 
venture-capital strategies, where Temasek 
jointly-sponsored or led a deal), using the 
experience to amplify net returns and drive 
additional exposure to direct investing. 
Following this approach, by 2015, Temasek’s 
co-investment share of its private market 
portfolio had already reached over 40%, with 
its exposure to global markets having 
increased to 30% of total.
Interestingly enough, in the last three years, 
we have observed Temasek’s long-term 
approach to co-investments paying back in 
terms of access to direct deals. Today 
Temasek has a strong direct investments 
programme, with offices in major global 
financial hubs outside of Asia (New York and 
London), with direct private-equity and 
venture-capital investments accounting for 
60% of the portfolio.
Temasek has become a successful direct 
investor through a gradual evolution from 
being an investor in funds, to partnering in 
co-investments, and on to direct solo 
investor, with further levels of sophistication 
around types of direct investing (mature vs. 
early or growth stage). Having strong LP-GP 
relationships with major private-equity 
funds is of critical importance for ongoing 
co-investment volume and knowledge 
exposure to emerging areas. At the same 
time, strategies can gradually evolve from 
being purely focused on domestic regional 
investments, to include a broader global 
reach as the fund strengthens its internal 
capabilities and expands its reach.
Across multiple co-investment examples, we 
observe that Temasek’s model and approach 
is characterised by a relatively high level of 
maturity, strong experience and a ‘quasi-
private-equity fund’ appetite for direct 
investments, and a high level of engagement 
with their co-investment partners.
Temasek’s success can be attributed to 
three key elements: a strong and 
experienced team in line with international 
standards for private-equity funds, a forward-
thinking approach to investing in advanced 
or complex technology sectors, and a 
structured process for undertaking direct 
investments.
CASE STUDY
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An example of Temasek’s approach to 
successful co-investments is its 2017 
investment in The Real Pet Food Company, 
an Australian supplier of chilled pet food, for 
$770 million. Despite Temasek not being the 
leader in the deal, it had an active role 
throughout the investment assessment 
process, developing their independent due 
diligence on the asset and forming their own 
opinion on the attractiveness of the 
investment. Post-acquisition, Temasek is 
actively engaged with the other partners in 
the deal to help drive the asset’s North 
American and Chinese market expansion.
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GIC so far has been leading the pack in co-investments. 81% of total co-investments 
value can be ascribed to the Singaporean fund. Furthermore, together with its sister 
fund Temasek, they account for almost 90% of investment value. This demonstrates 
the trailblazer status of Singaporean funds and their determination to be among the 
first to reach the next stage of SWF investing.
FIGURE 24 | Coinvestments ($M)
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FIGURE 25 | Coinvestments ($M)
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TABLE 2 | The league table of SWF coinvestments
Top 10 deals      
SWF Target Country Year Sector Value USD MM Partners
GIC Pte Ltd Akzo Nobel's 
NV Speciality 
Chemicals Unit
Netherlands 2018 Chemicals 5,850.00 The Carlyle Group
GIC Pte Ltd Veritas 
Technologies 
Corporation
USA 2016 Personal & Business 
Services
3,700.00 The Carlyle Group
GIC Pte Ltd Multiplan Inc. USA 2016 Personal & Business 
Services
2,500.00 Hellman & Friedman 
LLC Leonard Green & 
Partners LP
Mubadala 
Investment 
Company PJSC
XIAOJU KUAIZHI 
INC.
China 2017 Personal & Business 
Services
2,000.00 Softbank
GIC Pte Ltd ANT FINANCIAL 
SERVICES GROUP
China 2018 Personal & Business 
Services
1,076.92 Khazanah Nasional 
Berhad, Warburg Pincus, 
Canada Pension Plan 
Investment Board, Silver 
Lake, Temasek, General 
Atlantic, T. Rowe Price 
Associates, Inc., The 
Carlyle Group, Janchor 
Partners, Discovery 
Capital Management, 
Baillie Gifford, and 
Primavera Capital
GIC Pte Ltd ALLFUNDS BANK 
SA
Spain 2017 Banking, Insurance, 
Trading
994.48 Hellman & Friedman
Temasek Holdings 
Pte Ltd
NN Group NV Netherlands 2014 Banking, Insurance, 
Trading
725.11 RRJ Capital 
GIC Pte Ltd Blocks A and 
B of Hwaseong 
Dongtan Logistics 
Complex
South Korea 2018 Real Estate 570.00 ADF Asset Management
GIC Pte Ltd Kronos Inc USA 2014 Personal & Business 
Services
375.00 Blackstone, Hellman & 
Friedman and JMI Equity
Temasek Holdings 
Pte Ltd
Kunlun Energy Co. China 2012 Petroleum & 
Natural Gas
300.00 RRJ, CIC
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The only game in town: 
the rise of direct equity 
partnerships
Boasting an average annual growth rate in invested value of 12.3%, direct equity 
partnerships have been rapidly gaining ground in the last ten years. In 2009, they 
represented just a little less than 10% of total SWF investment. In 2018, a whopping 
41% of private markets invested value has been deployed through direct equity 
partnerships. Cumulative values in the observed period show that direct equity 
partnerships with $125 billion and 652 deals are SWFs preferred option when they 
are not investing solo. 
Direct equity partnerships USD MM Number of deals
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
14,000
16,000
18,000
20,000
24
49
63
54
42 44
64 65
120
127
Source: Sovereign Investment Lab, Bocconi University
FIGURE 26 | The rise of direct equity partnerships
10
Direct equity partnerships have proved especially relevant in the real estate 
sector. The sector has accumulated $38.5 billion of investments, or 31% of total 
partnerships, in the decade 2009-2018. Direct equity partnerships in real estate 
were particularly popular in the aftermath of the financial crises when SWFs were 
in search for safe assets and higher yields. Real estate, perhaps perceived as a less 
complex and relatively new investment class for many SWFs at the time, it seemed a 
natural choice for investment through direct equity partnerships. Financial services 
are the second most attractive sector for direct equity partnerships. However, a 
significant portion of the invested value accounts for SWFs investing in the sector 
during the crisis, whereas the sector has lost its popularity in the following years.
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CIC and QIA were among the first SWFs to execute significant deals through the 
direct equity partnerships model, Singaporean GIC and Temasek quickly caught 
up and have been dominating this space since the beginning of the decade. The 
Singaporean funds invested around $45 billion through direct equity partnerships 
in the observed period, accounting for 36% of total invested value. In terms of 
geography, the lion’s share of value, nearly 50% of the total, was deployed in Asia. 
FIGURE 27 | Direct equity partnerships ($M)
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MUBADALA LEVERAGING CO-INVESTMENTS TO 
MATURE INTO A GLOBAL DIRECT FINANCIAL 
INVESTOR ACROSS SECTORS
Mubadala investment objectives and 
approach have evolved over the last decade, 
from a double bottom-line and locally 
focused investor, into a diversified and 
financially driven global one. We observe a 
particularly clear change of pace in global 
investments after 2011-2012, with the share 
of deals made outside of the MENA region 
jumping above 60-70%.
Throughout this journey, Mubadala has 
established multiple relationships with 
global investment funds, in a LP capacity, as 
well as investment platforms and 
partnerships, that have enabled it to 
successfully expand its investment reach 
across new markets and sectors. As the 
fund’s model and risk appetite has evolved, 
Mubadala has became progressively more 
active in co-investments and direct 
investments space, leveraging an 
increasingly strong bench of internationally-
trained sector-focused investment teams, its 
financial strength, the scale of its portfolio, 
and its global relationships.
Particularly relevant is Mubadala’s 
foundation of investment partnerships 
across sectors, which have allowed it to 
de-risk their investments while getting 
exposure to new areas. A recent example is 
the 2019 acquisition of Wefox Group, a 
German platform for mobile insurance 
comparison. The deal was done together 
with CreditEase, a leading Chinese FinTech 
conglomerate, which would enable deeper 
understanding of the technology and 
potential, as well as facilitate faster 
expansion to the Chinese market.
Building on the expertise developed through 
some of these partnerships, as well as on its 
long history of global tech investments 
(started with the acquisition of an 8.1% 
stake in AMD in 2007), Mubadala overtime 
has established itself as a large and 
reputable investor in the technology space. 
This led in 2017 to the establishment of 
Mubadala’s own VC arm, which today is 
comprised of: Mubadala Ventures Fund I, a 
$400 million early growth venture capital 
fund setup jointly by Mubadala and 
SoftBank, a $200 million ventures fund of 
funds, a $15Bn commitment in SoftBank’s 
Vision Fund and, more recently, a $400M 
European tech fund. Following the 
experience of other Sovereign investors (e.g. 
Temasek) Mubadala VC arm has two global 
offices, one in San Francisco and now one in 
London, to enable direct market and 
pipeline access.
Overtime, Mubadala has also been able to 
leverage the UAE diplomatic relationships 
and reach in order to establish significant 
government to government investment 
platforms, which have allowed it access to a 
unique pipeline of deals in other markets. In 
this regard, the relationship with CDC 
International Capital and Bpifrance 
established in 2017 is probably the best 
example. The objective is to target primarily 
tech direct investments in the French 
economy with a funding capacity of up to 
$1Bn. Also in this case, Mubadala’s global 
credibility as a tech investor, as well as its 
ability to build a strong team of investment 
experts with global networks and 
CASE STUDY
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relationships has been instrumental. Similar 
to other SWF, Mubadala has been able to 
increasingly leverage its strong network of 
LP relationships as well as partnerships to 
propel its ability to invest directly, 
potentially alone depending on their access 
and risk appetite, across sectors and 
markets.
Mubadala: Private markets overview
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Top 10 deals      
SWF Target Country Year Sector Value USD MM Partners
GIC Pte Ltd
IndCor Properties 
Inc
USA 2015 Real Estate 3,645.00 
Global Logistic 
Properties
Qatar Investment 
Authority (QIA)
Agricultural Bank 
of China
China 2010
Banking, 
Insurance, Trading
2,800.00 
Kuwait, National Social 
Security Fund, Temasek
Khazanah Nasional Bhd M+S Pte Ltd Singapore 2012 Real Estate 2,786.65 Temasek
National Social Security 
Fund
CITIC Pacific China 2014
Banking, 
Insurance, Trading
2,200.00 QIA, Temasek
National Social Security 
Fund
Agricultural Bank 
of China
China 2010
Banking, 
Insurance, Trading
2,195.07 Kuwait, QIA, Temasek
Mubadala Development 
Company PJSC
The Foundry 
Company
USA 2009 Communications 2,100.00 ATIC
Mubadala Development 
Company PJSC
Aluminium 
Smelter in 
Sarawak 
Malaysia 2011
Construction & 
Construction 
Materials
2,100.00 
1Malaysia Development 
Berhad
Temasek Holdings Pte 
Ltd
M+S Pte Ltd Singapore 2012 Real Estate 1,857.77 Khazanah Nasional Bhd
GIC Pte Ltd BMC Software Inc USA 2013
Personal & 
Business Services
1,677.53 
Bain Capital and Golden 
Gate Capital
Temasek Holdings Pte 
Ltd
HOMEPLUS CO., 
LTD
South 
Korea
2015 Retail 1,600.00 
Canada Pension Plan 
Investment Board, 
Korea’s Public Sector 
Pension Investment 
Board
TABLE 3 | Direct equity partnerships top 10
FIGURE 28 | Direct equity partnerships ($M)
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Teaming up: platforms and 
investment alliances
Investment platforms are a more complex form of co-investment model than direct 
equity partnerships. Vehicles created by a SWF and a partner focusing on specific 
industries or geographies seeking to make multiple investments are considered as 
platforms. The longer life span of the vehicle and the opportunity to leverage on 
the partners’ knowledge and familiarity with the industry or region provide ample 
learning potential for the SWF, especially if the fund decides to assume a more active 
role in the investment process.
Platforms as a co-investment model for SWFs are recent: as a result, the absolute 
value, $12bn, of capital deployed through this model is quite low compared to the 
rest. In terms of number of investments, platforms have been growing on average 
95% every year. However, the lion’s share comes from the time period 2011-2014, 
where SWFs executed around 70% of deals recorded in this category. In the past 
year we witnessed a surge in popularity of platforms, but it is still too early to assess 
whether SWFs will continue embracing this investment approach.
11
FIGURE 29 | Investment platforms
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The financial sector, with $6.5 billion or 54% of investment value in platforms is the most 
popular sector, followed by real estate with $3.8 billion and transportation with $1 billion. 
PE houses were among the first players in the investment world to recognize the potential 
of SWFs and were quick to react by inviting SWFs as cornerstone investors in their funds, 
and later as co-investors, reflected by the large portion of platforms in the financial sector. 
It may be only a matter of time when sophisticated players from other industries realize this 
potential and start proactively seeking out sovereign capital. 
Asian funds lead the pack in platform investments. National Social Security Fund, GIC and 
CIC have deployed around $5.1 billion through platforms, that is 42% of total investment value 
through this strategy. Accordingly, almost 50% of the invested value targeted the Asian region.
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KHAZANAH NASIONAL INVESTMENT 
PARTNERSHIPS TO GAIN ACCESS AND EXPOSURE
Since its incorporation in 1993, Khazanah 
Nasional has focused mainly on developing 
the Malaysian economy; 80% of Khazanah’s 
investments are in Malaysian companies, 
highlighting the fund’s primary strategic 
focus on “core and or catalytic investments” 
which generate value within the national 
borders. While investments within Malaysia 
are done mostly by Khanzana alone, without 
support from partners or platforms, when 
venturing into regional or global deals, 
Khazana has leveraged both partnerships 
and platform approaches to gain access to 
deals, supplement their understanding of 
the markets, as well as to minimize its risk 
exposure.
In particular, investment partnerships 
appear to be the model of choice for 
Khazana, covering an average of about 50% 
of deals made in each year from 2010 until 
today. Two relevant and recent examples of 
partnerships would be: 
 • M+S is 60:40 joint venture established in 
2011 between Khazanah and Temasek to 
develop two mixed-use Real Estate 
developments in Singapore. Both 
projects finished by end of 2017 with a 
value of about $8B, and Khazanah is in 
talks to sell its stake to Temasek to 
monetize its investment. 
 • A consortium of investors led by 
Khazanah, and including Warburg Pincus 
and Golsman Sachs acquired 21% of 
China Huarong Asset Management for 
$2.35B in 2014, one year before exiting 
via an IPO 
Khazana has also tested the investment 
platform model; in 2012 in fact it 
established an infrastructure development 
platform together with Infrastructure 
Development Finance Company Limited 
(IDFC), focusing on investments in Indian 
roads, and it holds 80.1% of the equity. 
Nonetheless, this model has not been 
replicated further since 2012, with the focus 
progressively shifting towards more 
technology-focused investments, both direct 
as well as through funds. 
Khazana’s progression towards direct 
investments in tech has been characterized 
by participation in co-investment deals with 
a larger number of investors (average 
number of investors per deal from 1.9 in 
2010 to 7.4 in 2018), showcasing the fund’s 
approach to minimizing risk and accessing 
larger deals (average deal size in 2017 of 
about $600m, 10x from 2010). Recent VC 
investments are mainly focused with the 
TMT space (from 20% in 2014 to 40% in 
2018), as well as clean-tech, potentially 
indicating an effort to enhance sector 
expertise before making direct solo 
investments. 
In 2010, Khazanah entered the clean-tech 
sector through a $30m JV with Camco, a 
UK-based clean-tech fund. Investing with an 
expert player in a new market, Khazanah 
was able to commercially develop the sector, 
gain institutional knowledge and establish a 
business platform.
Relatively smaller in terms of exposure are 
Khazana’s investments in tech through 
funds, amounting to only 14% of the deals 
made in 2017. Relevant examples are 
Khazana’s undisclosed LP investments in 
Ancora Capital Management’s fund II 
(Indonesia-focused growth fund), as well as 
in Atomico’s fund (early stage investments 
focused on Europe’s largest technology 
hubs).
CASE STUDY
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Khazanah’s investment stategy over time
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RDIF’S INVESTMENT PLATFORM TO 
ATTRACT FDI’S
The Russian Direct Investment Fund is a 
good example of highly effective and 
focused investment platform. Established in 
2011 by the Russian government as a 
private equity fund with $10Bn in capital, 
RDIF serves as the main partner or 
“gateway” for foreign investors to access 
deals in Russia, with the fund’s participation 
in deals as an anchor or co-investor 
significantly reducing risks for foreign 
partners. By design, RDIF can participate in 
investments with up to 50% of the total 
transaction size, with the attraction of 
foreign capital being a key condition for 
investments approval; target of 9 to 1 FDI to 
RDIF investment ratio.
With this approach, RDIF has been able to 
play an important role in developing 
investment cooperation between Russia and 
the rest of the world. Since 2012, RDIF has 
in fact developed cooperation agreements 
across different sectors with partner 
investors from over than 15 countries 
(primarily Middle East and Asia), attracting 
so far over $ 40Bn in joint investment funds. 
Notable examples are the partnership with 
Mubadala ($2Bn committed capital, 
launched in 2013), the Russia-China 
Investment Fund (RCIF, $2Bn committed 
capital, launched in 2012), Russia-Japan 
Investment Fund (RJIF, $1Bn committed 
capital, launched in 2017), as well as the 
$500M commitment to automatic 
investments made by the Kuwait Investment 
Authority in 2012, later increase to $1Bn.
Based on publicly available information, it 
appears that the majority of investments are 
executed by RDIF either with participation 
of existing platform partners only, or 
through a mixed model which includes 
platform investors (firstly those committed 
to automatic co-investments) as well as new, 
deal-specific co-investment partners.
More recently RDIF, along with several other 
government entities, has been participating 
also in the “Investment Lift” program, which 
supports promising Russian small and 
medium size companies through equity 
financing, as well as through strategic and 
operational support. The first project within 
this program was financed in 2018 and 
demonstrates RDIF’s efforts to diversify its 
investment strategy while continuing to 
have an impact on the Russian economy.
CASE STUDY
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Source: Sovereign Investment Lab, Bocconi University
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TABLE 4 | The league table of SWF investment platforms
Top 10 deals      
SWF Target Country Year Sector
Value 
USD MM Partners
China Investment 
Corporation (CIC)
CIC-JC Flowers 
Financial Assets
USA 2008 Banking, Insurance, 
Trading
3,200.00 CIC-JC Flowers Financial 
Assets
Mubadala 
Development 
Company PJSC
RDIF-Mubadala 
Co-Investment 
Fund
Russia 2013 Banking, Insurance, 
Trading
1,000.00 RDIF
GIC Pte Ltd GLP/GIC Logistics 
fund
China 2018 Transportation 1,000.00 GLP
Temasek Holdings 
Pte Ltd
Hopu USD Master 
Fund I
China 2008 Banking, Insurance, 
Trading
1,000.00 Hopu USD Master Fund I
Kuwait Investment 
Authority (KIA)
FSI INVESTIMENTI 
SPA
Italy 2014 Banking, Insurance, 
Trading
684.55 FSI INVESTIMENTI SPA
National Social 
Security Fund
Shanghai SDIC 
Xieli Development 
Fund
China 2014 Banking, Insurance, 
Trading
660.44 Shanghai SDIC Xieli 
Development Fund
National Social 
Security Fund
China Electronics 
Innovation Fund
China 2013 Banking, Insurance, 
Trading
643.20 China Electronics 
Innovation Fund
Qatar Investment 
Authority (QIA)
Wessal Capital Morocco 2010 Real Estate 625.00 International Petroleum 
Investment Company 
(IPIC), KIA
Kuwait Investment 
Authority (KIA)
Wessal Capital Morocco 2010 Real Estate 625.00 International Petroleum 
Investment Company 
(IPIC), QIA
International 
Petroleum 
Investment 
Company (IPIC)
Wessal Capital Morocco 2010 Real Estate 625.00 KIA, QIA
FIGURE 30 | Investment platforms ($M) 
Source: Sovereign Investment Lab, Bocconi University
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FIGURE 31 | Investment platforms ($M)
Source: Sovereign Investment Lab, Bocconi University
National Social Security Fund
GIC Pte Ltd
Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA)
China Investment Corporation (CIC)
Mubadala Development Company PJSC
Others
13%
19%
11%
10%10%
37%
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The demise of 
solo investments
Direct solo investing is SWFs end-goal in their 
journey with in private equity markets. In 
view of this, it might seem surprising that the 
share of this investment strategy is rapidly 
decreasing, instead of gradually taking up a 
larger slice of the pie. However, as we have 
previously mentioned, we expect SWFs to face 
many challenges along the way and to eventually 
reimagine their investment strategy through a 
process of trial-and-error. One can argue that 
SWFs rushed their way into solo investing at the 
beginning of the decade only to realize later they 
weren’t sufficiently prepared, and that at this 
point, they might benefit more from the learning 
opportunities of other investment strategies 
until they ultimately revert back to direct solo 
investments. Indeed, SWFs’ direct investments 
did not seem to have added much value over the 
long term. Bortolotti et al. have shown that the 
performance of SWF direct equity investments 
in publicly traded firms is lower than the one of comparable private investments. 
The persistence of this “SWF discount” and this might have induced funds to change 
strategies in the direct equity space in favor of collaborative investment models 
(Sudarskis, 2011). 
12
FIGURE 32 | Direct solo investments
Source: Sovereign Investment Lab, Bocconi University
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SWFs’ direct investments did not 
seem to have added much value 
over the long term and this might 
have induced funds to change 
strategies in the direct equity space 
in favor of collaborative investment 
models.
Direct solo investments have shrunk in both invested value and number of deals. 
In 2009, SWFs deployed around 87% of their capital in private markets through 
direct solo investments. Furthermore, 69% of all deals in private markets were solo 
investments. Going to 2018, SWFs used this model in only 21% of their investments 
which account for 32% of invested value.
Similar to direct equity partnerships, the lion’s share of direct solo investments 
has targeted the real estate sector. Perhaps the lower perceived complexity of the 
industry along with a certain appetite for trophy 
assets have attracted $58 billion worth of SWFs 
investment value, almost a quarter of total 
invested value through direct solo investments. 
Right behind real estate, with $48 billion of 
invested value there is the financial industry. 
However, it is important to note that almost half 
of that value was invested in domestic markets 
as a way to support the sponsoring country’s 
financial system in times of need.
Qatar Investment Authority with $62 billion 
invested value and China Investment Corporation 
with $49 billion are the most active funds in direct solo investments. Together they 
make up a little over 40% of overall investment value in this category. An interesting 
detail is that both funds have significant amounts of domestic investments. QIA has 
invested a third of the $62 billion at home, while CIC directed a quarter of their $49 
billion at domestic companies.
57
Source: Sovereign Investment Lab, Bocconi University
Real Estate
Banking, Insurance, Trading
Transportation
Chemicals
Restaurants, Hotels, Motels
Other
18%
22%
15%
8%
5%
32%
FIGURE 33 | Direct solo investments $M 2009-2018 
Source: Sovereign Investment Lab, Bocconi University
Qatar Investment Authority (QIA)
China Investment Corporation (CIC)
Temasek Holdings Pte Ltd
GIC Pte Ltd
International Petroleum Investment Company (IPIC)
Other
18%
24%
10%9%
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31%
FIGURE 34 | Direct solo investments $M 2009-2018
Top 10 deals      
SWF Target Country Year Sector
Value 
USD MM
China Investment 
Corporation (CIC)
LOGICOR EUROPE LTD UK 2017 Transportation 14,418.37 
Qatar Investment Authority 
(QIA)
Qatar Railways Development 
Company
Qatar 2009 Transportation 13,260.00 
Abu Dhabi Investment 
Council (ADIC)
Abu Dhabi National 
Chemicals Company 
(ChemaWEyaat)
UAE 2009 Chemicals 8,000.00 
National Pension Reserve 
Fund
Allied Irish Banks PLC Ireland 2011 Banking, Insurance, 
Trading
7,264.00 
Temasek Holdings Pte Ltd AS Watson Holdings Ltd China 2014 Retail 5,671.73 
Public Investment Fund (PIF) Uber Technologies Inc. USA 2016 Personal & Business 
Services
3,500.00 
China Investment 
Corporation (CIC)
GDF Suez Exploration & 
Production SA
France 2011 Petroleum & Natural 
Gas
3,258.71 
China Investment 
Corporation (CIC)
China Export & Credit 
Insurance Corp.
China 2012 Banking, Insurance, 
Trading
3,210.00 
China Investment 
Corporation (CIC)
China Export and Credit 
Insurance Corporation 
(Sinosure)
China 2011 Banking, Insurance, 
Trading
3,150.00 
Qatar Investment Authority 
(QIA)
Doha Global Investment Qatar 2013 Banking, Insurance, 
Trading
3,000.00 
TABLE 5 | The league table of direct solo investments
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Challenges ahead
SWFs’ journey in private markets is certainly not a linear process of 
disintermediation. Rather, it is a transition mostly driven by testing different 
models and adapting and optimizing investment strategies along the way. We are 
not claiming that collaborative direct equity investments are the ultimate, one-size-
fits-all investment model for all SWFs. In all likelihood, funds will diversify their 
investment strategies, maintaining sizable allocations to more conventional limited 
partnerships with private equity funds. We claim, however, that a visible trend is 
unfolding, and that the emerging strategies adopted by SWFs including insourcing, 
learning, branching abroad, and teaming up are all broadly consistent with the 
objective of getting a better understanding of investments in private markets.
In the bumpy road towards direct equity investing, SWFs will face common 
challenges with other institutional investors. Overstretched valuations in most 
segments of the market and intense competition for assets driven by the recent 
trend of mega fundraising will make it difficult to thrive in this compelling 
environment. SWFs, however, will be tested also on a different ground, namely 
governance.
Indeed, financial intermediaries such as private-equity funds are costly, but also a 
reassuring presence for both targets and recipient countries, as they can provide 
a shield from political interference. Commercial objectives and financial returns 
are in the DNA of private equity firms, and SWFs role as LPs signaled a credible 
commitment to passivity. As SWFs shift to direct equity, politically motivated 
investments become an issue abroad and at home. Indeed, SWF as large, direct 
shareholders in firms will be called to take a more active stance than they have 
displayed in the past, and this may raise political concerns. The presence of highly 
13
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skilled private investment partners mitigate the risk, but still SWFs will have to adapt 
their upstream governance systems vis-à-vis their sponsoring governments to ensure 
managerial independence while keeping accountability.
In this respect, an interesting development 
is taking place in Norway, where the 
government is considering an expert 
committee proposal to take the $1 trillion 
Government Pension Fund Global out of the 
central bank and into its own independent 
organization. A reserve fund would naturally 
be housed in the central bank and focus 
on public assets, while an endowment could have greater independence and delve 
more into infrastructure and property, as well as other private and less liquid assets. 
In a recent Financial Times interview, Yngve Slyngstad, the CEO of Norges Bank 
Investment Management, which manages the fund, claimed that “the central bank 
has been clear that this is a question of investment strategy and not a question 
of organisation. It is a question of how we want to think about the fund in a bigger 
context. That is why this decision is the most important for the last 20 years for 
the fund.”
SWFs – small and large - are bound to take important decisions with regards to 
their approach to direct private equity investments, and the multiple models 
identified in this report will still need a few years to prove their effective returns. 
This said, we believe that, given SWFs significant and increasing value allocation to 
private markets in search of sustained returns, adopting a broad set of strategies, 
including the multiple models outlined in this paper, would allow them to diversify 
and reduce their risk exposure in this asset class. Such approach would also allow 
SWFs sufficient time to ramp up their internal capabilities, given the strong need for 
transactional and sectorial expertise, together with access to a pipeline of deals, to 
perform well in direct private markets investments.
SWF as large, direct shareholders in 
firms will be called to take a more 
active stance than they have displayed 
in the past, and this may raise political 
concerns.
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Appendix: Data description 
and methodological note
The main source of this report is the SWF Global Transaction Database of the 
Sovereign Investment Lab (“SIL Database” from now onwards), at Bocconi University 
in Milan. The database tracks investment activity from 2000 to 2018 of 37 SWFs (see 
Table A. 1 below) for a total of 2,895 transactions representing an aggregated deal 
value of over 887 Bn USD. Data collected for each transaction originate from a mix 
of centralized sources (for example, Thomson One) and non-centralized sources (for 
example, sovereign wealth funds’ annual financial statements). Each transaction 
is characterised by a set of 99 variables, mapping several deal characteristics 
dimensions of the investing or the investee entity or the sector of activity of target 
companies of SWFs’ investments (“target company” or “target” from now onwards). 
For this study, we integrated the SIL Database with data on SWF investments as 
limited partners in private equity funds originating from Preqin. With respect to 
these additional data, it was not possible to identify the exact date of the SWF 
investment and, as a result, the fund vintage year was used as a proxy for the 
investment date.
Given the objects of the study, a subset of the SIL Database was employed for the 
analysis and it was selected with these criteria:
• Transactions completed during the 10-year window 2009-2018 are considered. 
Deals announced or rumoured are excluded from the analysis
• Transactions in private markets and investment partnership strategies are the 
focus of this analysis. Listed target firms are only considered in order to highlight 
the magnitude of investments in private markets but are not the object of this 
study. Private markets are defined as 
• Only investments in the equity of companies (referred as “Direct equity”), 
investment platforms (defined below) and investments in private equity funds 
(referred as “PE funds”) and real estate funds are taken into consideration. Other 
investment schemes are not considered for the analysis
The resulting sample comprises 1,748 SWF transactions in private markets from 
2009 to 2018 for a total deal value of 433 Bn USD.
In order to map and draw inference from SWFs’ investment activities as solo or 
along with other partners, the following classification of different types of investment 
partnership was developed, based on the level of intermediation, from full to low 
intermediation.
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PARTNERSHIP 
CLASSIFICATION DESCRIPTION
SUB- 
CLASSIFICATION
LP Investment The SWF invests in a private equity fund 
and it is thus a limited partner (LP). 
This represents the maximum level of 
intermediation because the SWF has little or 
no influence on investment decisions
-
Co-investment The SWF invests in a private equity fund and 
it is thus a limited partner (LP) but it also 
invests directly in a portfolio company of the 
private equity fund. 
As certain private equity houses manage 
many PE funds across the globe, when 
identifying co-investments, we consider as 
GP the parent company of the private equity 
fund, not the actual GP of the PE fund specific 
to the transaction. 
-
Investment 
platform
One or more SWFs commit funds into an 
investment vehicle which is managed by a GP, 
or create a joint-venture with pre-identified 
investment themes, target regions or sectors. 
Platforms differ from LP investors being the 
SWF the main anchor/lead investor of the 
platform. The capital share to trigger the 
platform status is 20%.
• FDI Attraction Funds: the 
platform focuses its 
investment activities in a 
specific country or region
• G2G Investment Funds: a 
SWF commits capital in 
a platform establishes 
a JV with other SWFs or 
government-controlled 
entities and investments 
are carried out in the 
home country of the 
sponsoring funds 
• Sectoral Investment Fund: 
the platform invests in 
pre-identified industries 
and targets within or 
across countries 
Direct equity 
partnership
The SWF invests in the equity of a target 
company with a PE fund, an industry operator 
or another partner. This category includes 
consortia established to jointly bid for a 
specific target.
-
Solo investment The SWF invests alone in the equity of a 
target company, without investment partners.
-
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TABLE A.1 | List of SWFs of tracked SWFs and their assets under management (AUM)
Country Fund name Inception year Source of funds
AUM 2018 
(USD BN)
Norway
Government Pension Fund – 
Global£ 1990
Commodity 
(Oil & Gas)
1,053.60
China China Investment Corporationß 2007 Trade Surplus 941.42
UAE-Abu Dhabi Abu Dhabi Investment Authority† 1976
Commodity 
(Oil & Gas)
683
Kuwait Kuwait Investment Authority† 1953
Commodity 
(Oil & Gas)
592
Singapore Government of Singapore 
Investment Corporationn†
1981 Trade Surplus 390
Saudi Arabia Public Investment Fund† 1971
Commodity 
(Oil & Gas)
360
Qatar Qatar Investment Authority† 2005
Commodity 
(Oil & Gas)
320
China National Social Security Fund† 2000 Trade Surplus 295
Singapore Temasek Holdingsµ 1974 Trade Surplus 235.11
UAE - Dubai Investment Corporation of Dubaiß 2006
Commodity 
(Oil & Gas)
230.05
UAE-Abu Dhabi
Mubadala Investment Company 
PJSCß
2017
Commodity 
(Oil & Gas)
226
Republic of Korea Korea Investment Corporation** 2005
Government-Linked 
Firms
134.1
Australia Australian Future Fund£ 2006 Non-Commodity 107.21
Russia National Wealth Fund and Reserve 
Fund66
2008
Commodity 
(Oil & Gas)
77.1
Libya Libyan Investment Authority† 2006
Commodity 
(Oil & Gas)
66
Kazakhstan Kazakhstan National Fund† 2000
Commodity 
(Oil & Gas)
60.9
Brunei Brunei Investment Agency† 1983 Commodity 
(Oil & Gas)
60
Turkey Turkey Wealth Fund† 2016 Non-Commodity 40
Malaysia Khazanah Nasional Berhardß 1993 Government-Linked 
Firms
38.85
Azerbaijan State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan*** 1999
Commodity 
(Oil & Gas)
35.81
UAE Emirates Investment Authority† 2007
Commodity 
(Oil & Gas)
34
New Zealand
New Zealand Superannuation 
Fund¥
2001 Non-Commodity 27.2
Ireland Ireland Strategic Investment Fund6 2001 Non-Commodity 22.48
East Timor Timor-Leste Petroleum Fund† 2005
Commodity 
(Oil & Gas)
16.6
Bahrain Mumtalakat Holding Companyß 2006 Government-Linked 
Firms
15.3
Russia Russian Direct Investment Fund† 2011 Non-Commodity 13
UAE - Dubai Istithmar World* 2003
Government-Linked 
Firms
11.5
Oman State General Reserve Fund* 1980
Commodity 
(Oil & Gas)
9.15
Oman Oman Investment Fund† 2006
Commodity 
(Oil & Gas)
6
65
Country Fund name Inception year Source of funds
AUM 2018 
(USD BN)
Angola Fundo Soberano de Angola† 2012
Commodity 
(Oil & Gas)
4.6
Nigeria Future Generations Fund** 2012
Commodity 
(Oil & Gas)
1.38
Panama Fondo de Ahorro de Panamaß 2012 Non-Commodity 1.37
Palestine Palestine Investment Fundß 2003 Non-Commodity 0.99
Kiribati
Revenue Equalization Reserve 
Fund*
1956
Commodity 
(Phosphates)
0.65
Vietnam State Capital Investment 
Corporatiod†
2005
Government-Linked 
Firms
0.5
Kingdom of 
Morocco
Fonds Marocain de Développement 
Touristique§
2011
Government-Linked 
Firms
0.2
São Tomé & 
Principe
National Oil Account* 2004
Commodity 
(Oil & Gas)
 <0.01 
Total AUM 6,111.08
£ AUM as of 30th June 2018 
† Estimate by SWF Institute as of August 2018
** AUM as of 11st June 2018 
¥ AUM as of 30st September 2018 
µ AUM as of 31 March 2018. For Temasek, the net portfolio value is reported.
ß AUM as of 30th June 2017 
* Sovereign Investment Laboratory estimate of assets under management (AUM) as of December 2016
66As of 1st July 2018. The Russian Reserve Fund is as of 1st January 2018 exhausted
***As of 1st April 2018 
ß AUM as of 31.12.2017 
§ AUM as of 31st December 2016 
 SWFs of Morocco and Palestine have been added to the SIL list in 2015. Public Investment Fund has been 
added to the SIL list in 2016. Turkey Wealth Fund and Fondo de Ahorro de Panama have been added in 2018
Abu Dhabi Investment Council joined Mubadala as of March 2018
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